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 The Abbe Gaultier was an agent or spy for the French Foreign Minister, Jean-
Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy.  Through much of the War of the Spanish Succession 
he lived in England and communicated with Torcy in coded letters.  He assumed several 
roles in the settlement of Utrecht.  His most prominent role was to provide a channel of 
communication which allowed the Earl of Oxford and the Duke of Shrewsbury, leaders in 
the new Tory ministry of 1710, to negotiate secretly with Torcy and to avoid the scrutiny of 
the Dutch, the Austrians, and members of their own cabinet.  During the negotiations at 
Utrecht he served the French Plenipotentiaries and acted as a courier for Torcy.  He 
corresponded on behalf of Oxford and Viscount Bolingbroke with the Stuart Pretender in 
France. 
 Francois Gaultier came to London in 1698 as chaplain to the Marechal de Tallard, 
the French Ambassador to London.  When Tallard returned to Paris, Gaultier remained in 
order to collect information for Torcy.  For a short period he was in the service of Count 
Gallas, and then he attached himself to the Earl of Jersey whose wife was a Catholic.  When 
Torcy heard that the Godolphin ministry might fall, he wrote to Gaultier in July 1710 
instructing him to contact the new favorites, Shrewsbury and Mrs. Masham, to find their 
sentiments for a negotiated peace.  Only a few weeks passed before the Earl of Jersey asked 
Gaultier to enquire as to whether he could negotiate for Torcy.  While Jersey was not a 
member of the new ministry, he was in contact with Shrewsbury and Oxford.  Between the 
fall of 1710 and April of 1711 Jersey made known to Gaultier the conditions under which 
England might agree to a peace between France and the Allies.  These secret negotiations 
have become known as the "Jersey" period on the negotiations of the Peace of Utrecht.  
Oxford and Shrewsbury stayed in the background, no doubt concerned that any direct 
contact with Torcy would be construed by the Dutch and Austrians as a betrayal of the 
alliance.  Bolingbroke and the rest of the Tory Cabinet were unaware that negotiations were 
in process.  The conditions set forth by Jersey were in fact a betrayal of the Allies and an 
attempt to benefit English commerce.  Queen Anne and the Tory ministry, however, very 
much wanted an end to the war and realized that the demands put forth by the Allies in 1709 
could never be accepted by France. 
 As the war in Spain seesawed back and forth during the fall of 1710, the Tories 
hesitated to make any concrete proposals to Torcy via Gaultier.  At one point Torcy offered 
to send someone of a higher level to negotiate, but the English insisted on mediation through 
Gaultier.  Once it became apparent, however, that Philip would be victorious, Gaultier wrote 
to Torcy in December 1710 that the English would not insist on restoring the House of 
Austria to the Spanish throne if English commercial interests could be secured. Jersey had 
also communicated to Gaultier that the new Tory ministry would welcome a Jacobite 
restoration.  A Jacobite restoration reflected Jersey's personal hopes more than it did the 
sentiment of the Tories, who were divided between Jacobites and Hanovarians.  For 
Gaultier, however, the possibility of seeing the Pretender on the throne as James III was as 
important as the peace itself.  With James on the English throne, France could look to 
England as an ally in its future dealings with the continent.  Gaultier therefore proposed to 
Torcy that Jersey be pensioned. 
 Gaultier came to France in January of 1711 without any written proposals from the 
Tories, but with verbal instructions to tell Torcy to make an offer to the Dutch for a 
conference.  Should a conference ensue, England was prepared to support Philip's claim to 
the Spanish throne and work out other difficulties which might prevent a general peace.  If 
the Dutch and Austrians proved obstinate in negotiations, England would be forced to sign a 
separate peace with France.  Torcy sent Gaultier back to London requesting that France treat 
directly with the Tory ministry rather than with the Dutch.  Oxford and Shrewsbury rejected 
this idea but proposed through Gaultier that the French send conditions for a conference to 
them, and England would forward them to the Dutch.  At this point the Tory ministry was 
still very concerned to bring along the Dutch in any peace effort. 
 Torcy's first proposal to Oxford and Shrewsbury was rejected for not being 
sufficiently specific.  It was also rejected for not being as favorable as the French offers 
made in 1710.  At this point Gaultier was once again sent to France.  In March 1711 Gaultier 
arrived at Versailles with a list of terms which Oxford and Shrewsbury wished for Torcy to 
put in the proposal for a conference.  Along with these terms they communicated to Torcy 
through Gaultier that the English would work to keep Philip on the Spanish throne and to 
revise the Barrier Treaty of 1709 to reduce the number of towns held by the Dutch.  In April 
1711 Torcy sent Oxford a proposal of terms for negotiations which were basically the terms 
communicated by Gaultier in March.  Torcy's terms were shown to Bolingbroke and the 
Tory cabinet on April 26, 1711 and were then forwarded to Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary. 
 The remainder of the preliminary negotiations were done by Matthew Prior and 
Nicolas Mesnager.  The result was an agreement to hold a Congress in Utrecht to begin in 
January 1712.  At Utrecht Gaultier was appointed to the position of secretary of the French 
Embassy.  The three Plenipotentiaries, the Marechal d'Huxelles, the Abbe Polignac, and 
Nicolas Mesnager, had requested Gaultier's presence in Utrecht.  He would be useful not 
only for his knowledge of the early negotiations, but he was to be the channel by which the 
Embassy could deal secretly with the English.  When the Congress came to a standstill due 
to the death of the son and grandson of Louis XIV, Gaultier was used by Torcy as a 
confidential courier between Paris and Madrid to work out a separation of the two crowns. 
 A second motif in the negotiations for peace was the desire of certain Tories and 
Louis XIV to restore James to the English throne after Anne's death.  In his conversation 
with Gaultier in 1710 the Earl of Jersey had no doubt overstated the commitment of the Tory 
ministry to a Jacobite restoration.  The Tories had passed the Act of Settlement in 1701, and 
there was no majority in either house to restore James unless he embraced the Anglican 
Church.  Be that as it may, Bolingbroke was opposed to the Hanovarian succession and very 
much hoped for James's conversion.  Oxford vacillated over the Jacobite issue.  Gaultier was 
well aware of the political situation in London when he wrote to Torcy on December 14, 
1713.  He told Torcy that Anne must live or the Stuart cause would be lost and that Oxford 
wished that James were as lax on his religious views as had been Charles II. 
 Despite the terms of the Peace of Utrecht which forbade France from supporting the 
Stuart Pretender, Gaultier at the behest of Oxford and Bolingbroke wrote to James in 
February 1714.  He urged James to seek God's guidance in deciding which communion he 
should choose, and he assured James that he could never assume the English throne unless 
he changed to the Anglican Communion.  James was appalled that a Catholic Abbe would 
ask him to dissimulate his religious beliefs and wrote a letter of complaint to Cardinal 
Gaulterio about Gaultier's conduct.  Torcy even commented that Gaultier deserved to be the 
Archbishop of Canterbury for his Anglican zeal. 
 Gaultier proved himself a worthy agent to Torcy as he guided the secret and delicate 
preliminary negotiations between the English and French.   His attempts on behalf of the 
Stuart succession after Anne's death were doomed to failure by the personality of James 
himself.  For a continued peace in England this was certainly all for the better.  Gaultier saw 
his own actions in the peace in somewhat grander terms than they deserved.  He approached 
the Pope requesting a Cardinal's hat for his contributions.  A hat he did not get, but Louis 
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